Yemen, The Road to
Total Disorder (3)
Government is divided between the ex- opposition parties and
President Saleh’s Party the (PGC).
Money, media, and security is taken by the ex-opposition. The PGC is controlling the foreign affairs
and part of the military ( part of the military – leaded by General Ali Mohsen-
have defected since March 2012 and is not under the control of the President
since then).
Over the past six months the priority of the government has
been to secure funds to overcome the fears of collapse of the economy. They have been successful and the foreign
support has improved the economic condition, or at least stopped further
deterioration.
In other areas the government has not been able to achieve
much. Electricity supply is still not
stable and electricity is on less than 50% of the time. Other services have either deteriorated or
have not witnessed any progress, including trash collection and water supply.
Fuel supplies have improved in the past few weeks. The government decided to reduce the price of
Gasoline and add the cost to Diesel, the main fuel for the poorer farmers. The government seems to be concerned about
pleasing the more influential urban population.
Security wise the situation has further deteriorated. Gunmen are running around the cities,
robberies are common, and the feeling of security is diminishing especially after
the tragic killing of security personnel in Sabeen Square. The split of power is giving a sense of
uncertainty and the recent crimes that go un-noticed by authorities further
increase uncertainty.
The situation in Taiz has improved after the appointment of
the new governor, but other areas of the country are experiencing more
difficulties including Aden, Abyan, Lahej, Hajjah, and Al-Baydha. Most of the main roads around the country are
not accessible or at least not secure.
The government media
is controlled by the ex-opposition parties who were able to shift its focus in
the past few months. The need for
“justice” and redistribution of resources is the main theme, and criticizing
the “previous” regime is used to keep people under control.
Military and the Power Struggle:
Up to March 2012, President Saleh was keeping control of the
military and security in the country with the exception of the defected First
Armored Division lead by Ali Mohsen, and the areas controlled by Al-Hothi in
the north. There were of course a number
of “hot” spots, but they were not affecting the overall situation.
Exactly one year from now President Saleh and country top
leaders survived an attempted murder. At
that point, it is believed that Saleh was in a position to retaliate and hit
his opponents. Many believed that
he continued to “rule” the country for more than three months from the hospital
in Saudi Arabia. He decided not to use
force. At that point the defected
military division was too weak to survive any attack. All other security arms of the regime were
still active including intelligence agencies.
Saleh is “officially” out of the game, but the picture is
more ambiguous. In order to satisfy the
ex-opposition parties President Hadi decided to replace a number of the
military leaders who are related to President Saleh. The recent attack on the security personnel
in Al-Sabeen Square, during the preparation of the celebrations of the National
Day, in a space that is under the control of the President’s Guards, puts a lot
of questions about the wisdom of Hadi’s decisions.
The ex-opposition parties are counting on the defected
military division, which now holds some increasing “legitimacy”. They also count on the Minister of Interior,
who directs security forces, although one of Saleh’s relatives still holds the
main position in the security forces.
The Republican Guards (RG), led by President Saleh’s sun,
are still the main force in the military.
The RG were not directly involved in the political conflict, except when
they were attacked by pro Islah (Islamist Party) supporters in their attempt to
control Sana’a Airport. The
ex-opposition parties believe that Saleh’s sun should leave his post.
Away from military we find a number of other players. In the north Al-Houthi (a Shite group) is
controlling Sadd’a Governorate and parts of Al-Jawf. In the south, Al-Qaeda supporters are
controlling parts of Abyan, receiving support from those who sympathize with
their ideology in Yemen and outside, including Somalia.
Tribes have big influence on the game in Yemen. Currently they are split. Many tribe leaders are still loyal to the PGC
and continue to support it. Others had
detached themselves from Saleh’s party, and followed the “ex-opposition”
parties, mainly the Islamist party. Most
tribe leaders have developed strong connections to economic opportunities in
urban areas, and thus could easily switch sides. Their influence is almost neutral because
they are not expected to take part in any military conflict.
Tribes related to Sheikh Al-Ahmar Sons, however, have taken,
and are ready to take part in military conflict. They are believed to be driven by temporary
benefits and they are expected to continue their support as long as finances
keep flowing.