Yemen, The Road to Total Disorder (3)

Yemen, The Road to Total Disorder (3)

 Coalition Government:

Government is divided between the ex- opposition parties and President Saleh’s Party the (PGC).  Money, media, and security is taken by the ex-opposition.  The PGC is controlling the foreign affairs and part of the military ( part of the military – leaded by General Ali Mohsen- have defected since March 2012 and is not under the control of the President since then).

Over the past six months the priority of the government has been to secure funds to overcome the fears of collapse of the economy.  They have been successful and the foreign support has improved the economic condition, or at least stopped further deterioration.

In other areas the government has not been able to achieve much.  Electricity supply is still not stable and electricity is on less than 50% of the time.  Other services have either deteriorated or have not witnessed any progress, including trash collection and water supply.

Fuel supplies have improved in the past few weeks.  The government decided to reduce the price of Gasoline and add the cost to Diesel, the main fuel for the poorer farmers.  The government seems to be concerned about pleasing the more influential urban population.

Security wise the situation has further deteriorated.  Gunmen are running around the cities, robberies are common, and the feeling of security is diminishing especially after the tragic killing of security personnel in Sabeen Square.  The split of power is giving a sense of uncertainty and the recent crimes that go un-noticed by authorities further increase uncertainty.

The situation in Taiz has improved after the appointment of the new governor, but other areas of the country are experiencing more difficulties including Aden, Abyan, Lahej, Hajjah, and Al-Baydha.  Most of the main roads around the country are not accessible or at least not secure.

 The government media is controlled by the ex-opposition parties who were able to shift its focus in the past few months.  The need for “justice” and redistribution of resources is the main theme, and criticizing the “previous” regime is used to keep people under control.

Military and the Power Struggle:

Up to March 2012, President Saleh was keeping control of the military and security in the country with the exception of the defected First Armored Division lead by Ali Mohsen, and the areas controlled by Al-Hothi in the north.  There were of course a number of “hot” spots, but they were not affecting the overall situation.

Exactly one year from now President Saleh and country top leaders survived an attempted murder.  At that point, it is believed that Saleh was in a position to retaliate and hit his opponents.  Many believed that he continued to “rule” the country for more than three months from the hospital in Saudi Arabia.  He decided not to use force.  At that point the defected military division was too weak to survive any attack.  All other security arms of the regime were still active including intelligence agencies.

Saleh is “officially” out of the game, but the picture is more ambiguous.  In order to satisfy the ex-opposition parties President Hadi decided to replace a number of the military leaders who are related to President Saleh.  The recent attack on the security personnel in Al-Sabeen Square, during the preparation of the celebrations of the National Day, in a space that is under the control of the President’s Guards, puts a lot of questions about the wisdom of Hadi’s decisions.

The ex-opposition parties are counting on the defected military division, which now holds some increasing “legitimacy”.  They also count on the Minister of Interior, who directs security forces, although one of Saleh’s relatives still holds the main position in the security forces.

The Republican Guards (RG), led by President Saleh’s sun, are still the main force in the military.  The RG were not directly involved in the political conflict, except when they were attacked by pro Islah (Islamist Party) supporters in their attempt to control Sana’a Airport.  The ex-opposition parties believe that Saleh’s sun should leave his post.

Away from military we find a number of other players.  In the north Al-Houthi (a Shite group) is controlling Sadd’a Governorate and parts of Al-Jawf.  In the south, Al-Qaeda supporters are controlling parts of Abyan, receiving support from those who sympathize with their ideology in Yemen and outside, including Somalia.

Tribes have big influence on the game in Yemen.  Currently they are split.  Many tribe leaders are still loyal to the PGC and continue to support it.  Others had detached themselves from Saleh’s party, and followed the “ex-opposition” parties, mainly the Islamist party.  Most tribe leaders have developed strong connections to economic opportunities in urban areas, and thus could easily switch sides.  Their influence is almost neutral because they are not expected to take part in any military conflict.   

Tribes related to Sheikh Al-Ahmar Sons, however, have taken, and are ready to take part in military conflict.  They are believed to be driven by temporary benefits and they are expected to continue their support as long as finances keep flowing.