Yemen-What is Next?
Date: March 6, 2011
This is an attempt to review the events over the past few months and read the implications for the future of events in Yemen.
The fall of Mubarak:
It is the fall of Mubarak that has triggered some dramatic developments in the already fragile situation in Yemen. Since that day the number of Yemenis taking their discontent with the regime to the streets has been increasing, in addition to demonstrations a number of sit-ins have been formed in the main cities, i.e. Sana’a, Aden, Taiz, Ibb, and Hodeidah. To better understand the situation in Yemen it is important to look back to 2009 and before.
The Elections:
In 2009 pressures from the opposition (mainly the opposition coalition known as the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)), the European countries, and the US on the ruling party, the People’s General Congress (PGC), succeeded in convincing the PGC to delay parliamentary elections and enter into dialogue with the opposition. The February agreement was mainly about the delay of parliamentary elections for two years. The purpose was to give time to discuss amendments to the constitution. The JMP saw this as an opportunity to better prepare themselves for fair elections. The PGC, on the other hand, saw it a way to buy time.
The opposition wanted the constitution to be amended to give more power to the parliament and reform the election system. Several attempts to reach an agreement failed because President Saleh was not ready to accept reforms that would limit his power. At the end of October 2010 the PGC practically announced the end of dialogue when it decided to go for the constitutional amendments and the scheduled parliamentary elections without the consent of the JMP. The PGC was one step closer to replicate what the National Democratic Party did in Egypt, ignoring the opposition and forcing them out of the political game. At that point of time Egypt was still perfectly stable.
Several attempts by the JMP to gather support for demonstrations against the regime and what they considered as a “coup” by the PGC failed. On January 14 the President of Tunisia flee to Jeddah shortly after demonstrations erupted in the country forcing the strong-hold president to leave.
Leave!:
Demonstrations picked up in Egypt on Jan 25 and the scene of the millions of Egyptians was overwhelming to the whole world. It was especially interesting for Yemen given the similarities between the two countries and regimes. On Jan 27 the JMP, building on the situation in Egypt, succeeded in organizing the first demonstration. The main message of the JMP was to denounce the PGC decision to abandon the February agreement. This was, however, the first time President Saleh was called to leave.
“The Day of Rage”:
Things were developing very quickly. On February 2 President Saleh made a pledge not to run for another term and to freeze the controversial constitutional amendments. He also introduced a few economic incentives and promised more jobs for the youth.
The steps taken by Saleh and his government did not stop the opposition from organizing more demonstrations. The first Yemeni “day of rage” called by the JMP was on February 3. The government was able to prevent the reproduction of Egyptian scenario by sending its supporters to occupy Tahreer Square (Liberation Square). The opposition was taken by surprise and called its supporters to alternatively go to Sana’a University. The “day of rage” was a very peaceful day.
The Youth:
On February 11 Mubarak stepped-down and several groups of unorganized youth took to the streets celebrating Egypt’s victory and calling Saleh to step down. Pro-saleh people also took to the streets, initially confronting demonstrators. After some clashes between the two groups that were seen as the regime’s use of “baltagia”, or paid people to target peaceful demonstrations, the government decided to protect demonstrators and refrain from using force.
While demonstrations against the regime continued by Sana’a University students (not related to JMP this time) JMP was reviewing Saleh’s call for dialogue. On February 14 JMP agreed to go into dialogue. Students’-led Demonstrations were growing as other groups joined them. They were initially confronted by security forces and they eventually turned into sit-ins. The sit-in near Sana’a University, being inspired by the sit-in in Taiz City, became a permanent camp attracting everybody against the regime.
JMP leaders were witnessing the progress the youth were making and they turned back and rejected Saleh’s call for dialogue and asked him to remove his relatives from key military and civil positions to ensure that he will keep the promises he made. The JMP eventually abandoned all calls for dialogue and “joined forces” with the youth groups. The new demand is the departure of President Saleh from power.
Saleh Panics:
For the first time President Saleh has lost the initiative advantage. He was moving hysterically trying to secure allies and defeat the growing “revolution”. He contacted tribal leaders, met with military and government, and called the religious scholars. He was repeating one word over and over again “dialogue”. People in the street as well as the JMP decided to keep deaf ears on Saleh’s calls.
JMP was able to take back the lead from the youth especially in Sana’a. Islah’s exceptional organizational ability was needed in the growing sit-in near Sana’a University (now known as Tagheer square). The scene in Tagheer square was changing quickly, first the youth, then other civil groups, now led by the JMP.
Tensions between the regime and Sheik Al-Ahmar’s sons were growing. President Saleh lost one of his long-time allies as they broke up. All the sons of Sheik Al-Ahmar turned against the President.
Saleh also was losing on another front. A number of his PGC party resigned denouncing “the use of force against demonstrators”. These include members of parliament and tribal leaders. Religious leaders called to rescue by Saleh split into two groups when Islah’s Zandani called Saleh to leave by the end of this year.
Tagheer Square:
The scene in Tagheer Square, now led by Islah, was changing again, more tribes, the Houthis, and now religious leaders are joining in.
Libya:
A number of external factors continue to affect the “game” in Yemen. The new “revolution” in Libya and its violent shape has probably played in favor of Saleh’s regime. People are now watching another scenario of the “revolution” and fear that such scenario is more likely in Yemen.
The JMP Game:
The JMP are making use of the “influence of the street” and realizing many benefits. If President Saleh leaves, they will reap the fruits of the “revolution”. If Saleh, on the other hand, is able to resist they are still the ones to negotiate with and they will have the option of going back to the negotiation table.
Saleh’s Game:
Saleh is still controlling a number of the game threads. He is the President of Yemen. This gives him a lot of flexibility to move. He has control over the government in addition to other authorities including traditional forces in the society. His family is controlling the military in addition to a number of key civil posts. He is leading the ‘still’ largest political party and he has the sympathy of many Yemenis.
Who is winning?
So what is the game all about?. JMP are counting on the growing support for the “revolution”. They think this support will eventually force Saleh to take hard decisions, either to leave, or make significant concessions. They are not willing at this point to negotiate with Saleh and they think they have nothing to lose.
On the other hand Saleh is carefully watching the development in the streets. The regime has learned to live with the demonstrations and sit-ins. Demonstrations and sit-ins are being protected by security police. In other places like Aden the government decided to withdraw the police from the streets. This strategy is effective. The number of demonstrations eventually went down and sit-ins are not growing in the same pace. The regime is also keeping the option of deploying its supporters to confront opposition demonstrators. The regime is again buying time. They think the momentum of the “revolution” will slow down, the different groups will eventually revise their options, and things will become under control once again.
What is next?
There are a number of other factors that will affect the outcome of this game. First, how will the attitude of the “now neutral” people in the main cities develop?. These people still form the majority and they could change the balance. Second, how will the traditional powers including tribes react to the situation?. Third, how will external factors (the US, the European countries, the Gulf States, the developments in Libya and other places, other international event) affect each side.
Time is an important factor. In two months the parliament term will expire and Saleh will lose one of its main “legitimacy” grounds. On the other hand people in the cities of Sana’a, Aden, and Taiz are starting to feel the effects of demonstrations and sit-ins. The economy is slowing down and many people are losing their income. Who is to blame?...... The “revolution”.
